Selections from
The Blog of
Musicalsandconspiracy.com
------------------------------------------------------------
Tuesday,
March 06, 2007
Mixed
marriages targeted: Is mixed
region a solution?
"As U.S. and Iraqi
forces attempt to
pacify the capital,
mixed couples who
symbolize Iraq's
once famous
tolerance are
increasingly
entangled by hate.
. . . 'In the
absence of security,
Iraqis are
protecting
themselves by
turning to their
sects and their
tribes,' said Zina
Abdul Rasul, a U.N.
human rights worker
who herself is a
product of a mixed
marriage. 'It is
becoming normal to
hear about mixed
families breaking
down.'
. . . While there
are no official
statistics,
sociologists
estimate that nearly
a third of Iraqi
marriages are unions
between members of
different sectarian
or ethnic
communities. In the
aftermath of the
U.S.-led invasion in
2003, many Iraqis
argued that the
prevalence of such
unions showed that
Iraqis cared more
about their Arab or
national identity
than their sect,
which would spare
the country a civil
war.
But Iraq's sectarian
strife has risen
sharply since the
bombing of a revered
Shiite shrine in
Samarra by Sunni
militants a year
ago. Since then,
more than 500,000
Iraqis have fled
their homes, a
number that is
growing by 50,000
every month,
according to the
United Nations. The
vast majority have
left mixed areas,
the main
battlefields of the
sectarian war."
[1]
Could a mixed,
secular province or
region be a
solution? If 1 in 3
marriages are mixed
marriages, then it
seems that they
would make up a
significant number
of people. If you
add other possible
inhabitants such as
family members of
the mixed marriages,
non-sectarian
secularists,
minority groups,
artistic/creative
types, other
targeted groups or
individuals, or
people who would
just enjoy living in
a mixed, secular
area, the number
would be even
larger. *
Last year's
federalism law is
due to take effect
in a little over a
year. It will allow
provinces to vote on
whether to form
semi-autonomous
provinces or join
with other provinces
to form
semi-autonomous
regions. There's no
reason that a mixed,
secular province or
region could not be
formed when this law
takes effect.
Of course, having a
country where one
could live
peacefully in any
location would
probably be the
preference. But
considering all the
violence over the
past years, this
sort of countrywide
peace, if ever
achieved, may be an
uneasy peace at best
for awhile. And even
with relative peace,
there is no
guarantee that mixed
marriages and others
will not continue to
be targeted. So the
formation of a
mixed, secular
province or region
with security
designed especially
for its inhabitants
seems like it would
be a desirable goal.
footnote
* Christians
might also be
included among these
groups unless they
succeed in forming
their own area.
source
[1] Raghavan,
Sudarsan. (The
Washington Post).
Marriages Between
Sects Come Under
Siege in Iraq. March
4, 2007.
posted: tuesday,
march 6, 2007, 6:30
PM ET
update: saturday,
march 10, 2007, 9:10
AM ET
------------------------------------------------------------
Saturday,
December 23, 2006
Is
Iraq
getting
ready
to
ask
America
to
leave?
/
Thoughts
on
the
morality
of
American
withdrawal
"After the invasion, as a Shiite religious revival blossomed, Iraq's clerics saw themselves as the caretakers of the nation's Islamic identity. They were as concerned about American power and ambitions for Iraq as they were about the importation of a decadent Western culture. Many refused to deal with U.S. officials . . . a tactic that reaps immense rewards today from a population that is increasingly disenchanted with the United States.
'There's no necessity to meet the Americans,' said Beirut-based Hamid al-Khafaf, the chief spokesman for Sistani. He added that Sistani favored peaceful resistance to end the U.S. occupation.
. . . Senior Sadr officials have circulated a petition among national lawmakers demanding a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. They have managed to get 131 signatures, nearly half of the parliament, [independent Kurdish legislator Mahmoud] Othman said.
. . . Hakim, he said [Mahdi Army member Ali Hussein], made a fatal mistake by meeting Bush. In today's Iraq, credibility and power are measured by opposition to the United States." [1]
Is Iraq getting ready to ask America to leave? According to the above article and other sources like a September 2006 poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes, many Iraqi politicians and apparently a majority of the Iraqi public would like to see America withdraw. (The September poll said that seven in ten Iraqis would like America to leave within a year and six in ten support attacks on coalition forces.) [2]
The petition by the Sadr officials demanding a withdrawal timetable would be a good solid step in this direction. A formal debate and vote by the Iraqi Parliament would be even better. The Parliament could also arrange a national referendum asking the Iraqi people if they wanted America to stay or go. (I had heard of the referendum idea in a reader's letter to the New York Times which I, unfortunately, cannot locate.) Broad-based, peaceful, mass demonstrations could also be helpful. *
If this is what the Iraqis truly want, then the above types of strong unambivalent expressions of discontent could very well lead to a successful outcome, especially since one of America's stated goals has been to give the Iraqis a voice in their newly democratic country.
If the Iraqis asked America to leave, it would also remove much of the America's moral obligation to remain, in my opinion, unless America has somehow manipulated Iraq into taking this position. Though America should still do all it can to help in other ways, considering its initial invasion was the cause of most of the current problems or allowed them to emerge. **
America could conceivably remain in well-defined, seemingly pro-American, areas like Kurdistan or maybe the northern Nineveh area to help protect these areas from attack. (I've read that some of the targeted Iraqi Christians have expressed a desire for a region in the Nineveh area) [3] America's presence in these areas would be purely defensive, however, and only at the request of the people in those areas. Their presence would not be used to stage present or future attacks on the rest of Iraq or the Middle East region, no matter what the cause. ***
footnotes
* Apparently, the Iraqi prime minister has most of the authority over Iraq's security matters and it's uncertain if Prime Minister Maliki would ever request an American withdrawal. On the other hand, Maliki is just one person and was not directly elected by the people of Iraq. So if the people's directly elected representatives in Parliament and/or the people themselves through a referendum were to formally request an American withdrawal, it would be interesting to see what would happen.
** America might also leave, from a moral perspective (if I can use that word again), if its continued presence was a necessary cause of most of the violence or if its presence was preventing a solution to the violence from being implemented. Though its other obligations would remain.
It's been said that America's continued presence has been the cause of the continuing insurgent and terrorist violence. If an American withdrawal would cause the insurgent-terrorist violence to cease, then America might leave for that reason. However, it's not certain if these two forces would, in fact, cease their violent attacks if America left since it's also been said that the insurgents' and terrorists' goal is not only to cause an American withdrawal, but to foment civil war through attacks on the Shiite majority.
One might also ask if America's withdrawal would cause the insurgents and terrorists to cease their violence, but America's withdrawal would also deny innocent Iraqis needed protection from ongoing sectarian violence, then should America morally remain or withdraw? I don't really have the answer to that. I'm just presenting general alternatives to show that it is not simply a matter of America staying is moral and America withdrawing is immoral or vice-versa.
On that note, America might also exit if it was suffering great hardship. It might take something of a moral hit for placing its own hardship above that of the Iraqis (whose hardship was caused by America's initial invasion, in my opinion), but it would be less of a hit than if America left just because it was tired or fed up with the situation.
*** Sadr has since introduced a law in the Iraqi Parliament that would require U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraqi cities by the end of August of this year (see Sadr's redeployment plan, 1/23/07.)
sources
[1] The Washington Post. Shiite Clerics' Rivalry Deepens In Fragile Iraq. December 21, 2006.
[2] Program on International Policy Attitudes. The Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq. September 27, 2006.
[3] The Associated Press. U.S. Iraqi Christians Seek Help. December 15, 2006.
update: friday, january 26, 2007, 2:06 PM ET
tags:
iraq
withdrawal
shiite
------------------------------------------------------------
Sunday, November 12,
2006
Federalize
Iraq's economy:
The Tall Afar
example
"A year
ago,
U.S.
officials
championed
the
military's
success
in
pushing
insurgents
out of
this
city in
Iraq's
northwestern
desert,
reclaiming
it for
the
roughly
250,000
residents
and
eliminating
an
insurgent
safe
haven.
President
Bush
publicly
praised
the 3rd
Armored
Cavalry
Regiment's
effort.
In the
months
since,
soldiers
say,
Tall
Afar has
proved a
model
for the
rest of
Iraq, an
insurgent
stronghold
turned
relatively
peaceful.
. . .
Hundreds
of
millions
of
dollars
was
promised
to help
rebuild
and
restore
Tall
Afar,
but the
money
has just
started
to
trickle
in
through
the
Iraqi
central
government's
staggeringly
slow
bureaucracy.
. . .
Sectarian
violence
has been
stemmed
by
cooperation
among
Sunni
and
Shiite
Muslim
sheiks.
. . .
'We had
high
hopes
the
Iraqi
government
would be
able to
produce
more
visible,
tangible
results
quicker,'
said
Brig.
Gen.
Mick
Bednarek,
deputy
commander
for
operations
with
Multinational
Division
--
North,
based in
Tikrit.
'How
long
will a
civilized
people
that are
very
much in
need of
basic
fundamental
services
wait
before
they are
frustrated
and look
somewhere
else?'
Jibouri,
the
mayor,
said:
'You
can't
separate
what
happens
in Tall
Afar and
what
happens
in the
rest of
Iraq. If
Iraq
recovers,
Tall
Afar
will
recover.
If Iraq
doesn't
succeed,
Tall
Afar
will
again
fall.' "
[1]
So
wouldn't
it be
better
if
places
like
Tall
Afar
could
receive
their
funds
directly
instead
of
having
to rely
on the
much-troubled
central
government?
Does
Iraq's
future
have to
depend
on the
successful
creation
of a
viable
government
on the
largest,
most
complex,
national
level?
Couldn't
it also
have the
chance
to
succeed
on the
less
complex,
more
manageable,
local
level
where
their
efforts
would be
tied to
the
practical
concerns
of their
daily
lives
rather
than the
grand,
so-far-intractable,
political
concerns
that are
plaguing
the
politicians
in
Baghdad?
Maybe
the role
of
Iraq's
central
government
in the
economy
could be
that of
oversight.
They
could
assert
their
power
only in
the most
egregious
instances
of local
corruption
or
incompetence,
otherwise
leaving
them
alone to
find
their
own
paths to
success.
footnote
*
The
Iraqi
government
is
"working
on the
creation
of their
reconstruction
board
which
would be
able to
disburse
money
more
quickly
for
projects
because
the
Ministry
of
Finance
is
having
trouble
disbursing
money,"
said
Secretary
of State
Condoleezza
Rice at
a
December
14
interview.
[2]
sources
[1] The
Washington
Post.
Tall
Afar's
Long
Road
Back:
City
Seen as
Model in
Curbing
Violence
Is
Struggling
to
Rebuild.
November
11,
2006.
[2] U.S.
Department
of
State.
Interview
With The
Washington
Post
Editorial
Board.
Condoleezza
Rice.
December
14,
2006.
update:
sunday,
december
24,
2006,
3:10 PM
ET
---------------------------------------------------------------
Wednesday, November 01, 2006
Saudi
ambassador says partition
would be disaster / disaster
counterarguments / five or
more region federalism /
Iraqi Constitutional
federalism
"Saudi Arabia's
ambassador to
Washington . . .
Prince Turki
al-Faisal cautioned
against the notion
of splitting the
war-scarred nation
into three sectors
for Kurds, Shiites
and Sunnis.
. . . 'To envision
that you can divide
Iraq into three
parts is to envision
ethnic cleansing on
a massive scale,
sectarian killing on
a massive scale and
the uprooting of
families,' he said.
'Those who call for
a partition of Iraq
are calling for a
three-fold increase
in the problems,'
Prince Turki said.
'It is practically
impossible for Iraq
to be divided on
sectarian lines or
even on ethnic
lines; there is just
too much
intermingling of
Iraqis with each
other in every part
of Iraq.' "
[1]
There seems to be
the suggestion
lately that Iraq is
a largely mixed
population country
and not the nation
that outside of
mixed cities is
divided into largely
Kurds in the north,
Sunnis in the center
and Shiites in the
south as I had read
before. Was I
misinformed? Does
this mean I'll stop
coming across
descriptions such as
"Shiite-south" or
"Kurdish-north?" But
if this is true,
then the degree to
which Iraq's
populations are
mixed will have an
effect on any
possible partition
solutions. The more
mixed, the harder it
will be. Though the
Shiites and Sunnis
seem to be driving
each other out of
their respective
neighborhoods, so
maybe there won't be
any mixed cities
after awhile. That
would seem to make
partition easier. At
least the physical
aspect of it. I
don't think it would
bode well for future
relations between
the two violently
formed halves of
these formerly mixed
cities. (see "Five
or more region
federalism" below
and also "Federalism
and mixed cities"
and
Land swap federalism
postings.)
As to the idea that
partition would lead
to massive ethnic
cleansing, this
didn't happen in
Bosnia. Though
partition has
apparently failed in
other countries, I
imagine that if it
were decided to
partition Iraq,
either in the hard
or soft version, it
would be done based
on the model of the
successful
partitions and not
the unsuccessful
ones. *
On the uprooting of
families, from what
I gather, many
families have
already left on
their own and many
others would leave
if they had the
means to leave or
had willing
countries that would
accept them. The
issue of uprooted
families - if I'm
understanding it
correctly - could
also be addressed by
making the moving of
families voluntary.
If, for some reason,
a family chose to
remain in a
dangerous area when
transport to an area
of safety and
support was offered,
they would be free
to do so.
The way I see it is
that given the
present situation,
if Iraq was divided
into three or more
regions of largely
alike people, they
could turn their
attention from the
killing of non-alike
people and
concentrate on
building a
relatively peaceful
and prosperous
region for
themselves and their
fellow region
dwellers. They could
also concentrate on
building an
effective security
force comprised of
people they could
trust since having
an effective
security force seems
to be an important
factor in
maintaining a
relatively peaceful
region. And since
they would be secure
in their region,
they might not feel
threatened by the
presence of minority
groups in their
regions and would
allow them the
rights and
privileges that the
majority enjoyed as
long as they did not
threaten the
majority status quo.
Each region would
also have minority
members of the other
regions' majority
groups living in
their region, so
there could be a
kind of reciprocity
of good treatment of
each others'
minority members
within each region.
And also, the
national government
or a committee
organized by the
regions could serve
as an independent
arbitrator of any
particularly
contentious issues
that may arise.
I believe that one
of the main reason
Iraq seems to be
failing is because
so many things seem
to be tied to the
efforts of a largely
ineffective national
government. And the
ineffectiveness of
the national
government (though
they have had some
successes) seems to
be tied to the
unwillingness or
inability of the
national leaders of
the different sects
to work together to
make the so-called
hard decisions.
Partition or
federalism, in
theory, should
remove this obstacle
of sectarian
gridlock since each
region would consist
of largely one sect,
so that each ruling
sect should be able
to make the
so-called hard
decisions without
having to deal with
the intractable
opposition of the
rival sect members.
And when they make
these so-called hard
decisions, each
region should be
able to build the
necessary political,
economic and
security structures
necessary for the
well-being and
contentment of their
respective
constituent
population.
Minority rights will
be an important part
of this type of
majority-ruled
region. The
existence of
minorities within a
majority-ruled
region should not
preclude the
successful existence
of this type of
region. Kurdistan
would be an example
of a relatively
successful
majority-ruled
region that respects
the rights of its
minority members,
more or less.
Good relations and
well-defined borders
between the regions
would also be
important. Support
of insurgencies into
one another's
territories or
fighting over land
would not make for a
model of stability.
Just because the
national sect
leaders couldn't get
together in making
decisions does not
mean that regional
sect leaders
couldn't get along
with one another on
the diplomatic
level. The vital and
potentially
exacerbating issues
of money and power
that had to be
grappled with on the
national level would
largely be absent
from the
inter-regional
level. Each region
would already have
these things, so the
relations between
the regional leaders
should be much less
complex and
antagonistic than
they apparently were
for the purely
national sect
leaders.
There are probably
other possible ways
besides federalism
of overcoming the
sectarian divisions
and creating an
effective
government. These
may work as well, as
badly or better than
federalism, but I've
been following
federalism, so am
concentrating on the
possibilities of
that potential
solution.
I am also not
advocating
sectarianism for its
own sake, but only
as a possible
solution for the
present conditions
that seem to exist
in Iraq.
soft partition
I would probably
prefer a softer form
of partition, like
Kurdistan, because
it appears less
drastic than hard
partition and would
seem less
objectionable to the
people in Iraq.
Though many
apparently oppose
soft partition as
well and federalism
should not be
attempted without at
least a majority
consent.
80% violence
area partition
On November 15,
2006, General
John Abizaid
said that
"around 80% of
the sectarian
violence in Iraq
happens within a
35-mile radius
of Baghdad."
[4]
So maybe
only that area
needs to be
partitioned.
They seemed to
have already
tried blocking
off Baghdad
without much
success,
however, if
that's the same
as partition.
There might also
be benefits to
federalizing
(i.e.,
soft-partitioning)
the area outside
a partitioned
80% violence
area. Their
trusted regional
security forces
could help
protect them
against any
violent
influences that
slipped through
the 80% area's
partition. These
defensive
actions could
also help
contain the
violence within
the 80% area as
well as allow
the Iraqi
national and
Coalition forces
to concentrate
their efforts on
the 80% area
since the
federalized
areas would
largely be
handling their
own security.
Self-defending
federalized
outer regions
might also serve
as a de facto
partition of the
80% area if a
formal partition
of that area was
not constructed.
Five or more
region
federalism
A US Government map
of religious and
ethnic locations in
Iraq seems to
indicate five
clearly defined
regions that consist
largely of the
following five
groups: Kurd, Sunni,
Shia, Kurd-Sunni and
Shia-Sunni
[3].
So if
partition were
chosen as the
solution, then maybe
instead of three
regions (Sunni, Shia, Kurd), they
could have the above
five regions
instead, with a
possible sixth
region consisting of
the 80% violence
region.
Much of the tension
in the mixed
Kurd-Sunni or
Shia-Sunni regions
may be coming from
the more homogenous
regions. Moktada
al-Sadr, leader of
the Mahdi Army
militia, is
headquartered in
Najaf in the
southern Shia region
and most of the
insurgents and
terrorists seem to
be based in the
Sunni region. It
could also be coming
from outside
countries like Iran,
Syria, Saudi Arabia
or America. The
point is that
they're coming from
the outside. Even if
local people are
being recruited to
take part in the
sectarian violence,
it seems like it is
the outside forces
that are doing the
recruiting. Or the
locally organized
violence is a
reaction to the
violent actions of
these outside
forces.
From what I read in
the papers, many of
the people from
these different
sects seem to say
that they got along
before the rise of
the sectarian
violence. And they
apparently still get
along, even risking
their own safety to
help one another.
Though this seems to
be changing. But
hopefully they
aren't too far gone
to revert to their
old generally
harmonious ways if
given the
opportunity. So if
it is true that most
of the people in
these mixed areas
get along or
recently got along,
then why could a
mixed area not be
viable? Isn't it the
outside, provoking
forces - the
militias, insurgents
and others - that
are causing the
problems and are
giving the mistaken
impression that most
members of these
different sects have
a deep-seated desire
to harm one another?
And if the majority
of people in these
mixed areas could be
protected from these
outside forces,
couldn't their areas
be as viable now as
they were before the
rise in sectarian
violence?
If these mixed
regions became
federalized, they
might be able to
protect themselves
from these outside
forces better than
the current national
government is able
to do. They could
focus on the
building of their
mixed region and not
be tied to or
influenced by these
outside forces like
some factions within
the national
government seem to
be.
The mixed regions
would need to know
the complete truth
of
their situation and
have a strong belief
in their ability, as a
large and powerful
group of like-minded
people, to take
control of their
lives. They must
also get organized,
formulate a viable
plan and find the
best way to
implement their
plan.
These mixed regions
might also turn out
to be more secular
than the homogenous
regions since one
religious group
would not
predominate. This
would be especially
good for those who
would prefer to live
their lives in a
largely secular
manner. They could
be like Iraq in the
1970s before Saddam
started attacking
everyone. Those who
would like to live
in an area governed
by one religion
could live in the
Sunni or Shiite
region. And the
people in those
regions who don't
like that way of
life could move to
one of the more
secular regions.
(The Sunnis might
not be overly
religious. I don't
want to confuse them
with al-Qaeda or the
Taliban. The
Sunni-dominated
Saddam era was
secular. But still,
they seem to want to
dominate, so the
mixed region could
provide a place for
those who don't want
one sect to
dominate.)
And the mixed
regions, being
located between the
more homogenous
regions, might also
serve as buffer
zones between those
regions. After they
established their
independent natures,
they might even be
able to serve as
mediators between
those regions -
assuming tensions
still existed -
since the mixed
region between the
Sunni and Shiite
regions has both
Sunnis and Shiites
and the mixed region
between the Sunni
and Kurdish regions
has both Sunnis and
Kurds. (The Shiites
and the Kurds seem
to largely get along
with one another
already.)
With over 2 million
Shiites, Sadr City
could probably be
part of the Shiite
region even though
it's in a mixed
region. The Shiites
could also form two
or more regions if
their various
subgroups could not
work something out.
And I also read that
the some of the
persecuted Iraqi
Christians would
also like to form
their own small
region, so this
would be something
else to consider.
[6]
Iraqi
Constitutional
federalism
The Iraqi
Constitution
contains a
fairly detailed
plan for
federalism.
Since they've
seemed to have
already thought
it through, this
is probably the
plan that should
be followed,
more or less, if
federalism ever
occurs in their
country. It
doesn't specify
a set number of
regions either.
Each governate
(or province)
votes on whether
it wants to form
a region by
itself, with
others or not at
all. So secular
or Christian, as
well as any type
of Sunni, Shiite
or Kurdish
regions, are all
possibilities
under the Iraqi
plan.
[7]
miscellaneous
Iraq could still be
one nation under all
the above
partition-federalism
systems, if that's
what they wanted.
Iraq's political
system could be
similar to the
United States which
has 50 federalized
states. It's already
covered in their
Constitution.
[7]
There are some other
issues to consider
such as the apparent
objection of many or
most Iraqis to
federalism and the
problematic nature
of the Sunni region.
These issues are
discussed in another
posting. (see
Satterfield and
Abizaid say
partition would be
disaster / disaster
counterarguments /
strongman-led Sunni
region.)
footnote (Bosnia
counterargument)
* "There are so
many people killing
so many other people
for so many
different reasons --
religion, crime,
politics -- that all
the proposals for
how to settle this
problem seem
laughable. It was
possible to settle
Bosnia's civil war
by turning the
country into a loose
federation, because
the main parties to
that conflict were
reasonably coherent,
with leaders who
could cut a deal and
deliver their
faction.
But Iraq is in
so many little
pieces now, divided
among warlords,
foreign terrorists,
gangs, militias,
parties, the police
and the army, that
nobody seems able to
deliver anybody.
Iraq has entered a
stage beyond civil
war -- it's gone
from breaking apart
to breaking down.
This is not the Arab
Yugoslavia anymore.
It's Hobbes's
jungle."
[8]
Maybe Iraq is too
splintered now for
federalism-partition
to work. But if they
were to try, they
might try the
following: Militias,
parties, police and
the army seem to be
sect-based. So if
they were grouped
into their
respective
sect-based regions,
the previously
warring subgroups
might possibly be
able to come to an
understanding.
Working together
with subgroups of
their own sect would
seem more likely to
succeed than with
subgroups of other
sects. Many say that
the Shiites are
splintered now, but
that they are
attempting to form a
united front.
(Though if the
Shiites or other
sects weren't able
to work together for
some reason, the
formation of two or
more subregions is
always a
possibility.) To
take another
example, Kurdistan
had a number of
warring factions in
its early stages,
but they were able
to come to an
understanding for
the common good. So
there's always hope.
Warlords, foreign
terrorists and gangs
would be a
police-security
matter that could be
handled by the
hopefully effective
police-security
forces of each
sect-based region
with assistance from
coalition forces.
And the improved
economic and
political structures
that were built by
these regions could
reduce the number of
recruits for and
support for many of
these violent
splinter groups.
So it would be a
two-step solution.
The subordination of
sect-based splinter
groups under a
common sectarian
power base would
come first, then the
coalition forces
could battle the
police-security-based
splinter groups
until a region's
police-security
forces was ready to
take over. And since
the sectarian
splinter groups of
the first step seem
to presently
constitute the
majority of
violence, the number
of coalition forces
needed for the
second step should
be much less than is
needed now.
And though
Bosnia has provided
a proven,
time-tested model
for a possible
ending to the war in
Iraq, it seems to be
experiencing
difficulties when it
comes to building a
workable government.
So a new model for
this important
government-building
aspect of Bosnia may
be needed. (see
Bosnia posting,
1/20/07.)
sources
[1] The News -
International. Saudi
warns of mass ethnic
cleansing if Iraq
splits. November 1,
2006.
[2] Embassy of the
United States.
Baghdad, Iraq.
Transcript
Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad and
General George Casey
during Joint Press
Conference. October
24, 2006.
[3] BBC News. Living
in Iraq: People. No
date.
[4] U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed
Services. Senate
Armed Services
Committee Testimony.
GEN Abizaid.
November 15, 2006.
(prepared
statement).
[5] The New York
Times. A Matter of
Definition: What
Makes a Civil War,
and Who Declares It
So? November 26,
2006.
[6] The
Associated Press.
U.S. Iraqi
Christians Seek
Help. December 15,
2006.
[7] Iraqi
Constitution. (iraqigovernment.org).
Accessed January 26,
2007.
[8] The New York
Times. Ten Months or
Ten Years. November
29, 2006
[TIMES SELECT].
resources
[1] Biden,
Joseph & Gelb,
Leslie. (PlanforIraq.com).
Biden-Gelb Plan for
Iraq. Accessed
January 7, 2007.
[2] O'Hanlon,
Michael E. & Joseph,
Edward P. (The
American Interest
Online). A Bosnia
Option for Iraq.
January 1, 2007.
update: friday,
january 26, 2007,
4:08 PM ET
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Monday, July 17, 2006
Is Iraq a moral issue?
While the debate over Iraq seems to be
focusing on questions of national security
and the cost of the war to America, isn't
there also a moral dimension?
[1] This dimension would be, of course,
the suffering of the Iraqi people. America's
invasion destroyed their country's
government and has not been able to replace
it with a workable alternative. This has
resulted in perhaps even greater suffering
than the people of Iraq had experienced
under Saddam Hussein. If America exits
before Iraq can stabilize, it appears that
this suffering will continue, if not
increase. Why is this not part of the debate
as well? *
footnote
* If
America stays, this does not mean it
has to follow the same (so far,
unsuccessful) course.
source
[1] The Washington Post. How Common Ground
of 9/11 Gave Way to Partisan Split. July 16,
2006.
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